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P L A m I F F ' S REPLY TO INTERVENOR-DEFENDANTS'
kCEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT,AND
PLAJNTIFF'S RESPONSE TO INTERVENOR-DEFENDANTS'
CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JZTDGiMEhT

Plaintiff,
Pueblo of Sandia, has moved for summary judgment seeking an
administrative correction to thc boundary between two parcels of property - one of which is
administered by the Department of the Interior for the benefit of the Pueblo and the other of
which is administered by the Department of Agriculture. Intervenor-defendant Btrnalillo
County (rhe "intervenor") has now filed a belated memorandum in opposition to plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment, as well as its own cross-motion for summary judgment. 1

-

Plaintiff filed its motion for summary judgment on June 26. 1996 well over a year aeo.
The intervenor, which was allowed into this case in February 1997, should, at very latest. have
filed its opposition brief at the same time as the government in June 1997. Instead, the
intervenor waited to file its response until after both the plaintiff and the defendant had fully
briefed their respective motions for summary judgment. This belated filing says a great deal
about the lack of merit in the County's attempt to inject irrelevant factual "issues" at the last
moment in an effort to avoid the force of the legal issues on which the Pueblo and the
government largely agree -- most notably, the &aJ extent of the Interior Depament's trust
responsibility to effect the words of a government translator that was.used by the Congress as
the proper boundaries of the grant area.

The P~leblo'sclaim stems from a 1748 land grant from the King of Spain.
Even the intervenor concedes that the official translation of that grant by David
Whiting, sf the United States Survevor General's office, which was subseauentlv adouted by
Coneress in confiiing the grant, plainly states that the Pueblo's eastern boundary of its
reservation should extend to the "main ridge," rather than the foothills, of the Sandia Peak.

Letter from the Secretary of the Interior Communicating Supplemental Reports from the Survqror
General of New Mexico in Regard to Certain Land C h i m in that Tem'tory (001807). In 1859,
however, a surveyor erroneously meandered the eastern boundary of the grant at the foothills of
the Sandia Peak. That survey error, buried
- in surveying jargon, went undetected for years,
while the heblo continued to use the area as its own -- principally for its religious ceremonies.
After the Department of Agriculture began to interfere with the Pueblo's use of the
claim area, the Pueblo asked the Department of the Interior, its trustee in such matters, to
comct the boundary. over a period of five years, the relevant officials at the h e n o r
Department, including its highest ranking legal authority on Indian matters. concluded that the
Pueblo's claim to the area in question was valid and that the erroneous survey should be
corrected. Plaintiffs Statement of Undisputed Facts Nos. 12-25. But in k e m b e r 1988,
Solicitor Ralph Tarr issued a new opinion that =versed those findings and rejected the Pueblo's
claim. That erroneous opinion was then adopted, without further comment, by then Secrrtary
Hodel. Plaintiff subsequently brought this action, =king declaratory relief rhat the eastern

boundary of its reservation extends to the main ridge of the Sandii Peak and a -fa

of title of

the claim area from rhe Department of Agriculturr to the Depar&nent of the Interior, which
would then hold the property in trust for the Pueblo.

In its motion for summary judgment and supporting memorandum, plaintiff described

the well-settled law that the Interior Department has a fiduciary obligation to its Indian wards
such as the Pueblo and that that duty is especially great in this case, where the enor was that of
a governmen1 surveyor and the benef~iaryof that error. if not comted, will be the

government u
f
.
~ i v e rthat
i fiduciary duty. the Interior Department was required to order a
corrected survey, so long as the Pueblo's claim to the disputed area was "reasonable." See.
e.g., Jicarilla Anache Tribe v. Sunron Enerev Corn., 782 F.2d 855 (10th Cir.) (en banc).

modified on other mounds, 793 F.2d 1171 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 970 (1986);
Navaio Tribe of Indians v. United States, 364 F.2d 320, 322-34 (Ct. C1. 1966). As found by
the number of high-ranking Interior officials, who repeatedly concluded that the Pueblo had
presented an entirely

claim, the Pueblo's position was far more than "reasonable."

Plaintiffs Reply Mem. at 12-14. Accordingly, the Department's refusal to correct the survey
constituted a breach of fiduciary duty owed
by the Department to its Indian wards.
... -

m,the intervenor contends that
the original 1748 land grant somehow intended to convey a "formal pueblo" - a "custom"
In response, the intervenor raises thre-e arguments.

sometimes followed (but more often disregarded) of granting one league in each d i d o n from
the pueblo plaza. &&, the intervenor attempts to distinguish Pueblo of Taos v.

a,
475

F. Supp. 359 (D.D.C. 1979). a case that c o n f m that the Secretary of the Interior must order a

corrected survey here. The intervenor moneously suggests that the insfant case is different

because the rights of private parties would somehow be affected by a nansfer in title from the
Department of Agriculture to the Interior.Deparment. &a&,

the intervenor asks this Court to

ignore the government's fiduciary obligation to its Indian wards because of the Pueblo's
supposed excessive delay in seeking tb vindite its rights.

As shown below, each of these three arguments is meritless. Like the govmunent,

the intervenor is simply unable to refute the Pueblo's claim, and p W s motion for summary
judgment should be granted.

I.

The Intervenor is Unable to Refute that
the Pueblo has Presented Far More than a
"Reasonable Claim" to the Claim Area
The intervenor fust contends that the 1748 land grant somehow intended to convey a

formal pueblo

- a "custom" inconsistently followed at the time of gmahg one square league in

each direction from the pueblo plaza.2 Yet the official Whiting translation, adopted by
Congress in confiming the Spanish land grant, sets the eastern boundary of the Pueblo's

, "main ridee called Sandia." The
reservation as the "Sierra Madre de Sandia." i . ~ .the
intervenor attempts to explain away the clear mandate of this translation by claiming that that
translation is error. The intervenor contends that Whiting erred in translating "Sierra Madre" as

"mainridge" rather than merely the "mountain range." The intervenor then argues that if
"Sierra Madre" had been translated as "mountain range," it would somehow be clear that the
Spanish land grant implicitly intended to convey only a formal pueblo. The intervenor's
strained argument fails for a number of reasons.
.- -

First, the intervenor is simply wrong in contendig that the official Whiting
translation is erroneous. Indeed. in a similar case involving the Elena Gallegos grant, which is
immediately south of Sandia, the Court of Private Land Claims ruled that by establishing the
boundary with even the 'more general language, "on the east the Sandia Mountains," the grant
could only be interpreted to extend to the

of the Sandia Mountains. Opinion in

Donanciano Gurule v. United States of America, Case No. 51, Court of Private Land Claims.
December 1, 1893 (000494-000504).~
The intervenor's citation to the primiples of statutory construction articulated in United States
v. Roscnblum Truck Lines. 315 U.S. 50, 53 (1941) and other cases is imlevant. This is not a
case turning on an issue of statutory interpretation. Rather, the question presented hem is
whether the Secretary of the Interior &uld ignore his trust responsibility and refuse to correct
the erroneous government survey. As even the intervenor concedes, the government's fiduciary
responsibilities to the Ptueblo mandates that all ambiguities be resolved in favor of the tribe.
Intervenors Mem. at 4. In fact, as plaintiff has previously established, the Secretary's fiduciary
duty requires him to adopt the Pueblo's position so long as it is reasonable. &Plaintiffs
Mem. at 12-14; Plaintiff's Reply Mem. at 5-8.
The intervenor suggests that the Elana Gallegos grant is somehow distinguishable because

that grant refers to the eastern boundary as "Sierra de Sandia," rather tban "Sierra Madre de
Sandia." In fact, the coun's opinion makes clear that its decision is of general applicability to
the number of land gram in the area, such as the Pueblo's, that refer to the Sandia Mountains
as an eastern boundary. Op. at 1 (000496). 4 (000499) ("This conshuction must be approved as
the most rational one in all such cases. ") In concluding that the eastern boundary could only be
read as the summit of the mountains, the court first emphasized that in that region, far better

Footnote continued on next page]

.

Moreover, the intervenor's reliance on the four square league "custom" ignores the
clear evidence presented by the Pueblo that that "custom" was at best inconsistently followed
and cannot overcome the express words of the Whiting translation. & Dec. 10. 1996 O~inion
at 7, n.3. For example, it is undisputed by the intervenor and government alike that Spanish
authorities granted nearby Acoma Pueblo a total area of 95,791 acres - more than five times the
area of four square leagues (which is about 18,000 acres) and nearly three times the corrected
grant area that Sandia now seeks. Similarly, Santo Domingo Pueblo was granted an area of
74,741 acres - more than four times the four square league "limit." and more than

the

area Sandia will have after the correction. It is thus clear the fonnal pueblo "custom" was
- -

hardly an immutable rule that could overcome the specific language of the 1748 Spanish grant
later endorsed by Congress. Furthermore, it is well-settled that e h i c evidence, such as
evidence of "custom." can not be used to place a c o ~ c t i o on
n a deed that is inconsistent with
its plain wording.
generally 26 C.J.S.

&.

&.g., Duffield v. Duffield, 127 N.E. 709,710 (Ill. 1920).

&

Deeds 5 92, at 850.

In any event, the intervenor's attempt to raise a disputed issue of fact as to the
meaning of the 1748 grant dccument is legally irrelevant given the reliance on that translation
by Congress. Even if the original land grant were open to more than one interpretation,
Whiting's translation

- as the official translation of the United States eovenvnent - is

controlling in this case.
~ o o t n o t econtinued from previous page]
natural resources, including water, timber, and grass, are fouod on the slope of the mountain
rather than thc plains below. Op. at 2 (000497). Second. the court noted that the Elana
Gallegos had consistently acted as if their property reached to the summit of the mountains.
Op.at 3 (000498). Third. the court reasoned that it is far easier to use the peak of the mountain
for purposes of establishing a certain boundary as opposed to its base. Op. at 3 (000498). As
the Interior Department attorney res~onsiblefor Indian land claims found. each of these three
factors is equaiiy applicable to ~andia'sclaim here. Memorandum from kssociate Solicitor,
Indian Affairs to Assistant Secretarv. Indian Affairs at 8-9 (000764600765). In fact, in
establishing Sandia's boundaries, the 1748 land grant explicitly refers to the "convenient
pastures, timber, water, and watering places in abundance" that should be contained within the
reservation.
.

-

It is undisputed that Whiting was acting in his official capacity as the government
translator for the Surveyor General's Office when he translated the Sandia grant. Walter Alan
Mige, The Pueblo of Sandia Grant Boundary Issues and Encroachments of Sandia Land Claim

(Jan. 1983), at 33 (000001-000180). And, Robert McClelland, then Secretary of the Interior,
transmitted the Whiting translation as the official translation to Congress for its use in

confiiing the Spanish land grant. Lenerfrorn the Secretary of the Interior Communicating
Supplemental Reports from the Surveyor General of New Mexico in Regard to Certain Lnnd
Chims in rhar Temmtory.Coneress then ado~tedthe whit in^ translation in confinnine the

Sandia land erant. An Act to C o n h the Land Claims of Certain Pueblos and Towns in the
. .-

Territory of New Mexico @ec. 1858) in The Statures at Lurge and Treaties of the United Stntes
of America, (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1859), XI, 374.

Even a centuxy later, government officials continued to treat the Whiting translation

as the official translatiori and, as such. the correct articulation of the Pueblo's boundaries. For
example, Associate Solicitor Vollman relied upon the Whiting translation in concluding that the
Pueblo's eastern boundary should extend to the main ridge of the Sandia mountains.

4.6 (000757-000769).

Significantly, the intervenor does not even attempt to dispute these points. To the
contrary, the expert on whom it relies so heavily, Dr. Stanley Hordes. concedes that Whiting's
&lation

was the basis for "the official establishment of the boundiuics of the Pueblo of

Sandia" and that based on the Whiting translation, "Congrrss confumed the grant to the Sandia
Pueblo. " Hordes Report at 23.
Moreover, as p h i i f f explained in its opening memorandum and in its opposition
brief. the Pueblo does not need to establish that the grant language can Q& be wnst~cdas
sening the eastern boundary at the "main,rklgewof Sandii Peak in order to prevail in this action.

& P l a i i s Mcm. at 10-16; Plaintiffs Fkply Mcm. at 4-8. Rather, given the federal

government's fiduciary obligation to the New Mexico pueblos, Sandia need only show that it
presented the government with a reasonable claim to the disputed land.

a,
e.g., Jicarilla

Avache Tribe v. Suwron Enerev Corn., 782 F.2d 855 (10th Cir.) (en banc) (adopting as the
majority opinion the concurring and dissenting opinion of Judge Seymour reported at 728 F.2d
1555 (10th Cir. 1984)). modified on other mounds, 793 F.2d 1171 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 970 (1986); Navaio Tribe of Indians v. United States. 364 F.2d 320. 322-34 (Ct. C1.
1966).
The intervenor does not dispute this law nor suggest that plaintiff's interpretation of
the grant document is not at least "reasonable." How could it? That much at least is established

-

by the undisputed fact that every Interior official who examined the issue up until Mr. Tarr's

revised opinion

with the Pueblo's position:

- In 1983, the Department's Office of Trust Responsibility issued a memorandum
endorsing the'Pueblo's claim. Memorandum from the Director of the Office of Trust
Res~onsibilitiu.BIA. to the Suoerintendent. Southern Pueblos Aeencv. BIA. (July 8,
1993) (000194-000197).

- In 1986, after reviewing additional nports provided by the Pueblo, then
Assistant Secretary of the Interior Ross Swimmer endorsed the Pueblo's request for a
survey correction and sent it on to the Solicitor's Office for the necessary legal work
to correct the moneous &y.

Plaintiff's Statement of Undisputed Facts No. 14.

- In April 1987. Timothy Vollman, then Associate Solicitor for Indian Affairs.
completed a f o n d opinion concludiag that the Pueblo bad prrsentcd a d i d daim

and that the erroneous survey should be comcted. Memorandum from Associate
Solicitor. Indian Affairs to Assistant Secretarv. Indian Affairs (000757-000769).

- Indeed, even Mr. Tan himself initially endorsed the Vollman opinion and sent
it on to the Agriculture Department with a notation that he was "inclined to adopt" it.

W e r from Solicitor Tarr to Mr. Hicks. (April 8, 1987) (000771-000783).

In short, wh&, as here, official after official who has studied an Indian claim has

held that the claim is valid

- where even the Solicitor himself indicated that he intended to

adopt that view prior to political objections of another government department that wanted to
f - that more than "reasonable" Indian claim can not be rejected.
retain the land for w

Clearly, the three Department opinions concluding that the Pueblo had a valid claim c o n f i i the
"reasonableness" of the Pueblo's position

II.

- and rhat is all that is necessary.4

As in Pueblo of Taos v. Andrus,
Plaintiff's Claim Will Not De~rive
,4nv Third Partv of an ~nter&in Land
As plaintiff has noted repeatedly, Pueblo of Taos v.

a,
475 F. Supp. 359

(D.D.C. 1979). is on all fours with the case at bar. and makes clear that an erroneous
government survey cannot take precedence over Spanish grant documents that set foah a natural
boundary. &,4.g., Plaintiffs Mem. at 17-18; Plaintiffs Reply Mem. at 15-16. Seeking to
avoid the clear mandate'of Pueblo of Taos, the intervenor contends that that decision should be
disregarded because ordering a corrected survey there did not infringe upon the property rights
of private parties.
The intervenor is wrong. Here, just as in Pueblo of Taos, ordering a comcted survey
will not deprive any third party of an interest in land.' .While a small portion of the claim area
.-

For the reasons stated above, plaintiff ass~sthat the intervenor's misplaced r e l i e on the
Hordu opinion is insufficient to defeat plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. It is also
inappropriate for intervenor to seek summary judgment at this late date based on the novel, and
erroneous, findings in the Hordes opinion. Again. the only official translation of the land grant
is the Whiting translation, and that translation should be controlling.

u.

For the same reason, the intervenor's r r l i on
v.
942 F.2d 712 (110th Ci.
1991). mrt. denied. 503 U.S. 984 (1992), is misplaced. There, as will be explained in greater
detail infra at page 12, accepting the Indian tribe's position would have deprived a private party
of an interest in land.
The intervenor's r e l i i on De Guver v. Banning, 167 U.S. 723 (1897) and United
&&s V. Chandler-Dunbar Watcr Power Co,, 209 U.S. 447 (1908) is similarly misplaced. Both
those cases involve attempts by non-Mians to obtain title to land. By contrast, as this Court
has recognized, plaintiff is not seeking to divest the United States of ownemhip in land, but
nther is seeking judicial review of an adverse agency action. pet. 10. 1996 ODinion at 20.
Fwtnote continued on next page]

.

-

has been subsequently conveyed to private parties, the Pueblo has repeatedly waived any right to

this land. &e, g.g., Amended Compl. 1 2 ("The Pueblo of Sandia expressly excludes from the
area claimed in this action all lands held in private ownership and all leases, permits, rights-ofway, or other encumbrances in favor of private parties. ") The Pueblo seeks only to transfer title
to the remainder of the area wrongfully held by the Agriculture Department to the Interior
Department, where it may rightfully be held in trust and administered for the benefit of the
Pueblo.

The intervenor acknowledges that the Pueblo has repeatedly disclaimed any interest in
the property held by private parties. Nevertheless, the intervenor contends the Pueblo's waiver
-is insufficient for two reasons: (1) the Pueblo cannot alienate property without the approval of
the Secretary of the Interior, and (2) the intervenor's interests might somehow be indirectly

affected if title to the claim area is transferred to Interior.
The intervenor's argument that the Pueblo's repeated waiver is somehow ineffective
because it requires the approval of the Secretary of Interior has no basis in fact or law.

Fit, in

meetings with both the Sandia Mountain Coalition and the Pueblo, the relevant Interior officials
have stated that they do aanrovc the Pueblo's renunciation of any rights to any of the privatelyheld parcels. Hence, the professed fear that Interior will d i s a ~ ~ r o that
v e arrangement is
baseless.
Furthermore, Interior could not legally order a rrswey that would advmely affect
the private inholdm. The very statute that requires Interior to resurvey the Pueblo's boundaries

and issue a corrected survey expressly provides that "no such rrsurvey or rctracrment shall be
so executed as to impair the born iide rights of any

. . . owner of lands affected by such

Footnote continued from previous page]
Indeed, even the intervenor concedes that plaintiffs amended complaint is not brought pursuant
to the Quiet Title Act. Intervenor's Mem. at 10 n.11.

rehrvey or remacement." 43 U.S.C.5 772. As the Supreme Court explained many years ago,
in a holding that is just as valid today,
"So long as the United States has not conveyed its land it
is entitled to survey and resurvey what it owns to
establish and reestablish boundaries, as well one
boundary as another, the onlv limit beine that what it
thus does for its own information cannot affect the riehts
of owners on the other side of the line already existing in
theory of law." Lane v. Darlineton. 249 U.S.331. 333
(1918) (emphasis added).

In short, the intervenor is attempting to avoid by clear holding of Pueblo of Taos by
raising a tenuous chain of assumptions

- that this Court will ignore the clear statutory language

of Section 772, that this Court will further ignore the Pueblo's repeated waiver of any right to
land held by private inholders, and that Interior thereafter will ignore those same StatUtes and
waivers. The Court need not entertain such shained speculation.

The intervenor's second contention that ordering a corrected survey would have an
alleged indirect impact on third parties is equally specious. Its argument is based on one case,
Memomlitan Water Dist. of S. California v. United States. 628 F. Supp. 1018, 1021 (S.D. Cal.
1986). remanded on other mounds, 830 F.2d 139 (9th Ci. 1987),

affd, 109 S. Ct. 2273

(1989), which held that the Secretary of the Interior could not resurvey an Indian reservation

where the resurvey would deprive a third party of a tangiiic interest in property - water rights

in the Colorado river. By contrast, the intervenor docs not suggest that transferring title from
Agriculture to Interior would deprive it of any tangiile interest in any land. Instead, the

intervenor merely aserrs that the title uausfa would somehow infringe upon the County's open

space management plan (i.4.. recreational trails running through the area) and the exercise of the
County's police powers.
As explained fully in Fkpnsc of Phinti!T, Pueblo of Sandii,to Motion of Bernalilo

County. New Mexiw's to Intmem (dated July 21, 1995) at pages 12-15, such alleged interests

-

arc not legally M c i e n t to permit the &retary to ignore his fiduciary duty to the Pueblo.

Short of some recognized claims such as nuisance (and none is alleged here). a party has no
legally protectable interest in neighboring land. &, e.g., Bachrnan v. &&, 659 F. Supp.
308. 312 (D.V.1. 1986) (landowners' concerns about activity in adjacent property were not

legally protectable to justify intervention), aff*d, 849 F.2d 599 (3d Cir. 1988). Similarly. a
party's supposed recreational or aesthetic interests in land that it neither owns nor claims is not
legally protectable. See, g g . , Jac Courte Oreilles Bank of Lake Suverior Chivvewa Indians v.
Wisconsin. 116 F.R.D. 608. 610 (W.D.Wis. 1987) (denying motion of sport fishing
organization to intervene in lawsuit between Indian tribe and state of Wisconsin because
organization's recreational interests were not legally protectable).

In fact, in Pueblo in Taos, the government argued that the claim area included a
recreational mil and was frequented by campers. Defendants' Response to Plaintiff's Statement
of Facts as to Which There is No Genuine Issue, and Statement of Additional Facts as to Which
There is No Genuine I s k e at 2 (attached). Nevertheless, the court there concluded that the
plaintiff's boundaries should be extended to include the claim area. 475 F. Supp. at 367.
Nor is the intervenor able to explain how the transfer of title will impair the exercise
of its police powers. The federal government will continue, as before, to hold title in the
property. And the record in this case is undisputed that the Pueblo has never interfered with the
.

County's assertion of jurisdiction over private inholders who live within the aboundaries
of the Pueblo. &g Response of Plaintiff, Pueblo of Sandia, to Motion of Bemalillo County.
New Mexico's to Intervene. Attachment A, -davit

of L. Lamar Panish (March 17, 1995).

Simply put, plaintiff's claim seeks only a declaration of the proper boundary between
land held for the Pueblo and the adjacent lands held as part of a national forest. That boundary,

as set forth in the original Spanish grant and corresponding congressional enactments. exists
separate and apart from the desires any third party.

m.

There is No Excessive Delay
that Could Authorize This Court
to Imore the Government's Fiduciary Duty
Finally, the intervenor asks this Court to ignore the government's fiduciary duty to

the Pueblo because of the tribe's supposed excessive delay in seeking to vindicate its rights.
Notably, this argument is not even raised by the government -- the party subject to the Court's
equitable powers.
Once again, the intervenor's argument is based solely on one case, &yg v.

m,

942 F.2d 712 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 984 (1992),and that case is inapposite.
At issue in

was a private party's attempt to correct a patent that, because of an erroneous

survey, had excluded land that both he and his predecessor in intenst had used continuously for
sixty years. As a result of the error, title to the disputed land was held by an adjacent Indian
tribe, who had been conveyed the mounding property after the patent had been issued. The
tribe had taken no action with respect to the land and had consistently behaved as if the land was
included in its neighbor's patent.

Id. at 713, 717.

The court concluded that the Secretary of the

Interior had the authority to issue a corrected patent.

Id. at 715.

By contrast, here the Pueblo has consistently acted as if the eastern boundary of its
reservation extended to the main ridge of the Sandia peak - the tribe has used the claim area for
religious purposes for centuries. Moreover, unlike in

w,the Pueblo's action would not

deprive any private person of their inkrest in land. As d i s e d above, the Pueblo has

repeatedly mounted any intmst in land held by private parties and seek only a W e r of title
to Interior to be held in trust for the tribe.

In any event, the length of time between the. erroneous survey and the Pueblo's formal
claim should not prevent this Court from ruling that the Secretary of the Interior must adhere to
his fiduciary duty and order a corrected survey. The Pueblo's delay in seeking redress with the
Interior Department is not surprising, given that the error was buried in surveying jargon h a
document that could not be read, much less understood, by the Pueblo members. Moreover, for

almost all of the time bekeen the erroneous survey and the formal claim by the Pueblo, the
area was completely uninhabited and under the dominion of no one other than the Pueblo itself.
Accordingly, the Pueblo had no reason to suspect that survey was erroneous until the 1970s.
when the Forest Service began take actions on the land that were adverse to the Pueblo's rights.
Soon thereafter, the Pueblo made a formal claim asking the Secretary of the Interior to order a
corrected survey.
In short, the intervenor has done nothing to dispute the existence of a fiduciary
relationship beween the government and the Pueblo or the consequences of that relationship.

As set out fully in plaintiffs previous papers, that duty requires the Secretary to order a
corrected survey so long as the Pueblo's claim is reasonable. While the intervenor suggests
(erroneously) that the underlying Spanish land grant may be read in more than one way, it has
been unable to refute the reasonableness of the Pueblo's claim. Nor can it, given the numerous
high-ranking Interior ofhcials who agreed with the Pueblo's claim and the fact that the official
g land grant, sets the eastern
Whiting translation, adopted by Congress in c o n f ~ the
boundary as the "main ridge called Sandia." Accordingly, summary judgment for plaintiff is
appropriate.

Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, plaintiff's motion for summary judgment should be
granted and intervenor-defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment should be denied.
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